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When the news media publicize information commonly referred to as "prejudicial publicity," a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized. In Part I of this two-part article, the
author first examines the applicable standards of impartiality which a jury must meet in order for
a trial to be constitutionally "fair," and then defines that "prejudicial publicity" which can render
a jury unconstitutionally partial and hence a trial not constitutionally fair. Finally, existing methods
which have been used in an attempt to Orevent defendants from being convicted by juries rendered
partial by publicity are critically examined, with emphasis on the effect of each of these methods
upon the co-existing interests of the press, the defendant, and the Government which are sought to be
preserved.
In Part II, scheduled to he published in the next issue of the Journal, the author examines the
possibility of expanding some of the existing solutions, with emphasis on the importance of formu-
lating and making known to the press, Bar, and police a set of standards delineating the kinds of
material which are likely to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. After examining the sources of prej-
udicial publicity and noting the probable futility of internal control by the press., the author pro-
poses a remedial statute. Results of a poll of lawyers, police officials, and newsmen conducted by the
author are tabulated in appendices to Part II.-EDITOR.
In the exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of the press, news media publish informa-
tion concerning criminal cases. In the exercise of
hi constitutional right to a fair trial, every crimi-
nal defendant may demand trial by an impartial
jury. Often, however, publicity exposes potential
or actual jury members to information which is
not eventually admitted in evidence at the trial.
By thus enabling the jury to consider incompetent
material, publicity can be prejudicial to the de-
fendant, with the result that he is unable effec-
tively to exercise his right to a fair trial. Frequent
conflict between these fundamental rights consti-
tutes a serious problem to the administration of
This article was submitted by the author in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of .Master
of Laws, Northwestern University School of Law.
M.ay 1964. Minor changes have been made to bring it
up to date.
criminal justice and raises the question of how
the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial can be
preserved without infringement of the equally
important right to freedom of the press. A third
right is also concerned whenever this conflict oc-
curs-that of the prosecuting government to per-
form one of its vested functions, the administration
of criminal justice.
In an effort to formulate a solution to this in-
creasingly serious problem, these articles will re-
view the elements of these three distinct rights:
that of the defendant to a fair trial, that of the
government fairly to administer criminal justice,
and that of the news media to freedom of the
press; will attempt to define what is meant by the
phrase "prejudicial publicity;" and will analyze
the efficacy of existing methods of attempting to
deal with the problem in the light of their respec-
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tive effects on the co-existing and conflicting rights
sought to be preserved.'
I: AN IMPARTIAL JURY
The United States Constitution entitles every
defendant in a federal criminal action to a fair
trial by an impartial jury.2 Although the Constitu-
tion does not require the states to provide trial by
jury,3 every state by its own constitution guaran-
tees jury trials in criminal cases.4 The Constitution
does require, however, that whatever methods a
state elects to use for disposition of criminal cases
must be in accordance with due process of law;1
I A related question involving the same constitu-
tional rights is whether courtroom photography and
broadcasting should be permitted. ABA Canon of Ju-
dicial Ethics 35 flatly prohibits use of any cameras in
court. Texas and Colorado alone have not adopted this
Canon. Some controversy was recently afoot regarding
theproprietyof televisingthe Texas murder trial of Jack
Ruby, who killed Lee Harvey Oswald, alleged assassin
of the late President John F. Kennedy, on television.
See Time, Dec. 13, 1963, p. 82.JudgeBrown announced
on Dec. 19, 1963, that all still cameras and electrical
equipment, as well as television broadcasting equip-
ment, would be banned from Ruby's trial in his court-
room. Further, there has been controversy within the
ABA itself as to whether or not the Canon should be
amended to permit photography and broadcasting at
the discretion of the trial judge. See Wilkin, Judicial
Canon 35 Should Not Be Changed,48 A.B.AJ. 540 (1962).
Although broadcast of court proceedings may impede
the judicial process and impugn its integrity, the rea-
sons are wholly different from those which indicate that
publication of prejudicial publicity about a criminal
case will have that same deleterious effect.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI prevents federal abridge-
ment of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases.
3 The fourteenth amendment has not been held to
require the states to grant a right to trial by jury equiva-
lent to the sixth amendment right. Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 721 (1961) (dictum); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319,324 (1937) (dictum).4 COLUMBIA UUiv. LEGisLATIrE DRAF ING AND RE-
SEARcH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS 578-79 (1959).
5 Upholding the constitutionality of New York's
statutory "blue ribbon jury" system in criminal cases,
whereby lists of prospective jurors were limited by
occupation, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The function of this federal court under the Fourteenth
Amendment in reference to state juries is not to pre-
scribe procedures but is essentially to protect the in-
tegrity of the trial process by whatever means the state
sees fit to employ." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
294 (1947). Accord, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605
(1900) (due process does not require states to provide
for indictment by grand jury) ("[T]he state has full
control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil
and criminal cases ... ."); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90, 93 (1875) (trial by jury need not be granted by the
state in common law cases-the requirement of due
process is met "if the trial is had according to the settled
course of judicial proceedings.").
For examples of non-jury proceedings which, though
judicial, did not satisfy due process, see In re Murchi-
if the jury system is used, the jury must be im-
partial. 6 Consequently, defendants in state as well
as federal criminal prosecutions possess a right to
trial by an impartial jury.
To satisfy federal constitutional requirements,
the jury must meet the federal constitutional
standard in state as well as federal criminal cases.7
Since this standard is not specified in the Constitu-
tion, it has been variously fashioned by the courts.
"Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a
state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental
attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitu-
tion lays down no particular tests and procedure
is not chained to any ancient and artificial for-
mula." Because "The theory of our system is that
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced
only by evidence and argument in open court, and
not by any outside information, whether of private
talk or public print,"9 the basic question in resolv-
ing the issue whether a trier of fact possesses this
"mental attitude of appropriate indifference" is
"whether he has the ability to decide the facts in a
criminal case solely on the basis of the evidence
presented in court. Obviously a juror with this
ability is the impartial juror required by the fed-,
eral constitutional standard. And since, within the
scope of this paper, impartiality of the jury is the
determinant of whether or not a given trial was
fair, nothing less than trial before a jury composed
of such impartial jurors is a fair trial. The problem
of how to establish the existence of this ability
entails" both the substantive test of impartiality
used and the procedure for applying the test.
Until recently, with but a few exceptions, the
substantive test of whether a juror is sufficiently
impartial has been whether he testifies that he can
render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence presented at the trial. If this criterion
is met, a juror is not challengeable for cause, nor
is his presence on the jury grounds for mistrial or
continuance merely because he has been exposed
son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948).6 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Spies v. Illi-
nois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). See Riave, Fair and Impartial
Trial by Jury in the United States and in England, 50
A.B.A.J. 232, 233 (1964).
TFederal: Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497
(1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U S. 145 (1878). State: Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, supra
note 6, at 727; Spies v. Illinois, supra note 6.
8 United States v. Wood, supra note 7, at 145-46,
cited in Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 6, at 724-25.
9 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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to prejudicial articles or broadcasts, even if he
admits that he has formed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused.10 Recognizing
the intricacies and frailties of human nature, the
federal courts and a few state courts have recently
held this test an inadequate measure of imparti-
ality, with the result that a juror with preconceived
opinions of an accused's guilt may be found partial
if his declaration of impartiality, sincere though
it may be, is objectively untenable in the light of
his exposure to extrajudicial information about the
case.U1 The following statement by the Supreme
Court of Florida is illustrative:
"[A] juror's statement that he can and will re-
10Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Hopt
v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Dillon v. United States, 218
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1955); Rowley v. United States, 185
F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v. Griffin, 176
F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950);
United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1945); Commonwealth v.
Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 505-07, 159 N.E.2d 870, 883-
85, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); State v. LaRocca,
81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (App. Div. 1963);
State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 448-51, 384 P.2d 777,
790-92 (1963). See Hormys, T a S-mi--A MUaDR
CAsE 303-07 (1961), for an example of the hardship this
criterion can impose on a defendant. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), for the
outcome of Dr. Sam Sheppard's case.
Since each state conviction invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court on prejudicial publicity grounds
had been rendered by a jury of which more than one
member was found or deemed partial, the question
whether the presence on a jury of one juror who states
that he has an opinion which he can lay aside causes
that jury to be unconstitutionally partial-and hence
the included question whether that test is constitution-
ally permissible-has not yet been decided by the Court.
In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), eight of the
jurors had so stated; in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963), the Court presumed prejudice. See text
accompanying notes 17 & 18 infra.
"See United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313
F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963). "The influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsci-
ously fights detachm, nt from the mental processes of
the average man." Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 10, at
728. "No doubt ead juror was sincere when he said
that he would be fair and. impartial to petitioner....
[but] where so many, so many times, admitted preju-
dice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little
weight." Ibid. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp.
37, 58, 60 (S.D. Ohio 1964); SuLx-vAx, TIAL BY
NEywsPAPER 232-33 (1961). See also Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952) (dissenting opinion of
Frankfurter, J.); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50
(1951) (specially concurring opinion of Jackson, J.);
Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 505-08
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961);
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113-14 (Ist
Cir. 1952); United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885
(D. Vt. 1962). See note 90 infra and accompanying
text.
However, the mere jresence of an opinion as to the
turn a verdict according to the evidence sub-
mitted and the law'announced at the trial is not
determinative of his competence [impartiality],
if it appears from other statements made by him
or from other evidence that he is not possessed of
a state of mind which will enable him to do so."
Generally, the defendant complaining that his
trial was unfair due to prejudicial publicity bears
the burden of proving actual rather than specula-
tive prejudice.u While speculative prejudice is
established upon proof of the existence of a con-
dition which might result in prejudice, actual
prejudice is not established unless it is proved that
at least one juror in fact formed an opinion which
influenced his verdict. The "actual prejudice" test
compelled affirmance in two recent cases where,
although newspapers containing highly prejudicial
material were found in the jury room, the defend-
ant failed to prove that any juror read the articles.14
guilt or innocence of the accused, without more, cannot
disqualify a juror who attests to his ability to be fair
apd impartial. The trial court must "determine whether
the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such
as, in law, necessarily to raise the presumption of par-
tiality." Reynolds v. United States, supra note 10, at
156.
1 Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959). (Em-
phasis added.) To allow the mere presence of an opin-
ion to disquality a juror, it is said, would render it im-
possible to conduct jury trials under present conditions
of press coverage. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
251 (1910); United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 245,
258 (2d Cir. 1944); Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193
Md. 300, 330, 67 A.2d 497, 511 (1949), cer. denied, 338
U.S. 912 (1950).
Nevertheless, two trial courts in 1963 found it pos-
sible. A federal trial court in Minnesota excused poten-
tial jurors for the mere presence of opinion, United
States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963),
while a state trial court in Washington excused all po-
tential jurors who might possibly have formed an opin-
ion. State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937
(1963) (all who had read or heard of defendant were
excused).
Query whether the "mere presence of an opinion,
without more" does not deprive the defendant of the
presumption of innocence. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra
note 10; United States ex rd. Bloeth v. Denno, supra
note 11; Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904, 909
(6th Cir. 1953); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952); Singer v. State, supra at
23-24.
13 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952);
Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 878 (1957); Smith v. United
States, 236 F.2d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 909 (1956); United States v. Carruthers, 152
F.2d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
487 (1946); Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 899
(Alaska), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961); Morgan v.
State, 211 Ga. 172, 84 S.E.2d 365 (1954).
" United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d
Cir. 1951); State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 863-65,
385 P.2d 18, 22-24 (1963).
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However, it has been held that when potentially
prejudicial material has been publicized, a pre-
sumption of prejudice arises."5 For example, in
Commonwealth v. Crehan,6  the Massachusetts
Supreme Court presumed prejudice because the
jury was allowed to separate, and since the trial
court denied defendant's motion to poll the jury
after damaging articles were published, it was im-
possible to rebut the presumption of prejudice.
In Rideau v. Louisiana ,' where a film of defend-
ant's interrogation by a group of local police of-
ficials and his confession were broadcast on several
occasions over a local television station, the United
States Supreme Court reversed defendant's state
murder conviction without even using the tran-
script of the voir dire examination to ascertain
whether any juror had seen the film. The Court
held that the highly prejudicial nature and wide
dissemination of the film rendered a fair trial in
that locality impossible, and therefore examination
of the voir dire was unnecessary. In Inin v. Dmod,5
"6 United States v; Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir.
1962); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639 (6th
Cir. 1955). When the presumption arises, the trial judge
must take steps considered necessary by him to rebut it,
and if not convinced that it has been rebutted, he must
grant the requested relief (see notes 68-81 infra and
accompanying text). Ibid. The court in Briggs relied on
Stone v. United States,'113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940), a
case involving attempted bribery of a juror. The court
in the Stone case stated the applicable rule:
"The question is, not whether any actual wrong
resulted... but whether [the circumstances] created
a condition from which prejudice might arise....
[T]he law concerning juries .. . presumes that [out-
side] influence may act on some of them ... so as to
be beyond detection."
Id. at 77.
This principle was applied by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in the recent civil case of Bellows Falls Village
Corp. v. State Highway Bd., 123 Vt. 408, 190 A.2d 695
(1963). Upon finding that eight of the jurors had either
read the contents of or heard about an editorial slanted
against the defendant, the trial court set aside a con-
demnation award for plaintiff and ordered a new trial.
Affirming the lower court's action, the Supreme Court of
Vermont stated: "[T]he test is not whether the irregu-
larity actually influenced the result, but whether it had
the capacity of prejudicing the verdict.. .. Indeed, the
human mind often may be unaware of what factors in-
fluenced its judgment in a given situation." Id. at 414,
190 A.2d at 699.
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio
1964), the district court granted habeas corpus to Ohio
state prisoner Dr. Sam Sheppard, stating, "[Tihe pre-
judicial effect of the newspaper publicity was so mani-
fest that no jury could have been seated at that particu-
lar time in Cleveland which would have been fair and
impartial .... "Id. at 60.
16 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963).
17,373 U.S. 723 (1963).
1b 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
the first Supreme Court case upsetting a state
conviction on prejudicial publicity grounds, the
Court had found the jury not sufficiently impartial
after carefully considering the voir dire." The
Rideau case is the first in which the Supreme
Court has reversed a state conviction on proof of
speculative prejudice.
Because a trial judge has broad discretion in such
matters, an appellate court will not overturn a
finding of impartiality unless error is so manifest
that the judge's action amounts to an abuse of
that discretion."
With this background in mind, we must now
try to define exactly what is the "prejudicial
publicity" which can operate to deprive a defend-
ant of that impartial jury to which his federal
constitutional right to a fair trial entitles him.
II: WHAT IS "PREJUICIAL PuBLIcry"?
The trier of fact in a criminal case must reach
its conclusions as to a defendant's guilt only on
the basis of evidence presented in open court, and
not on any outside influence. A jury failing to ac-
complish this task does not meet federal constitu-
tional standards of impartiality, and the trial at
which the jury is not properly impartial is not
"a fair trial" within the federal constitutional re-
19 Eight of the 12 jurors stated that they had an
opinion as to defendant's guilt which, they further
stated, they could set aside. See id. at 728.
20 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878);
Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963); Dillon v.
United States, 218 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1955);
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir.
1952); Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir.
1950); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575, 578 (8th
Cir. 1928); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d
613 (1963); Hammons v. People, 385 P.2d 592, 595
(Colo. 1963); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 13 (Fla.
1959); State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 482, 363 P.2d
541,548 (1961); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d
849 (Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass.
487, 501, 508, 159 N.E.2d 870, 881, 885, cert. denied.
361 U.S. 895 (1959) (Brink's robbery case) ("The
judge... was in a better position than we to evaluate
the effect of publicity at that time."); Hagans v. State,
372 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S.
989 (1964).
The trial judge's discretion extends to his disposition
of motions for any remedies available to a defendant
against prejudiced jurors, since the granting of such
motions presupposes a finding of partiality. See notes
68-81 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, since
mandamus will not lie to compel performance of dis-
cretionary acts. this writ is generally not available to
compel the granting of such trial level reliefs. See, e.g.,
Hoffa v. Gray, supra. But see State v. Thompson, 123
N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1963), where mandamus was
granted to compel change of venue.
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quirement. Within this framework, the publicity
with which we should be concerned is publicity
which, if read or heard by potential or actual
jurors, may reasonably be used by them in decid-
ing the issue whether a criminal defendant is
guilty, and which might not be admitted as evi-
dence at his trial. If jury members are exposed to
such material and the material is not eventually
admitted as evidence, then the defendant's right
to a fair trial will have been violated in that the
jury had the opportunity to consider matters not
presented in open court in determining his guilt.
For example, in Marshall v. United States,21 de-
fendant was on trial for unlawfully dispensing
drugs in violation of a federal statute. Seven mem-
bers of the jury admitted having read news articles
containing facts relating to defendant's prior con-
victions for practicing medicine without a license.
The trial court had held evidence of these convic-
tions inadmissible on the ground that it was ir-
relevant to the issues in the case and would be
prejudicial to defendant. In the exercise of its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts,
the United States Supreme Court reversed Mar-
shal's conviction, stating: "[The jurors were ex-
posed] to information of a character which the
trial court ruled was so prejudicial it could not be
directly offered as evidence. The prejudice to the
defendant is almost certain to be as great when
that evidence reaches the jury through" news ac-
counts as when it is a part of the prosecution's
evidence."2
On the other hand, where the text of defendant's
confession was published before trial, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed his state conviction
on the ground that since the confession was sub-
sequently admitted in evidence, defendant was not
prejudiced by the publication.13 Moreover, where
a jury was exposed to publicity containing prof-
fered testimony which the trial court had excluded
merely on grounds of irrelevance rather than be-
cause of its prejudicial nature, the Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed defendant's conviction.'
The case law follows the general test outlined
above-if material, read or heard by jurors, was
likely to influence their decision as to a defendant's
guilt, and if the material was not admitted as
21360 U.S. 310 (1959).
Id. at 312.
2 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952).
2- Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cerl.
denied. 368 U.S. 56 (1961).
evidence, then the material was prejudicial to that
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Six categories of material appear to meet this
general test: (1) Confessions; (2) Prior criminal
activities; (3) Incriminating tangible evidence;
(4) Statements of persons who may not actually
testify; (5) Reports of proceedings from which the
jury has been excluded; and (6) Miscellaneous
inflammatory material which may sway a jury's
sympathies against a defendant.
(1) Confessions. No defendant can be convicted
upon evidence which includes an involuntary con-
fession, regardless of the truth of the confession,
25
and regardless of independent evidence sufficient
to sustain his guilt.26 Moreover, federal courts
must exclude certain voluntary cofessions as well,
if they resulted from prohibited official activity?
Since the jury must not consider the fact that a
defendant has confessed or the contents of his
confession unless and until that confession is held
admissible, a defendant whose purported confession
is published and then not admitted in evidence,
whether because not offered or because found in-
admissible, is certain to be prejudiced by such
publication. Reports that a defendant has offered
or attempted to enter a plea of guilty or of nolo
25 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
26 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958).
2 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (viola-
tion of FED. R. Cm. P. 5(a), speedy arraignment);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (arrest
illegal by fourth amendment standards). Furthermore,
the states will most probably have to follow Wong Sun
under compulsion of the principle of Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), and thus exclude voluntary state-
ments which resulted from (i.e., were "fruits" of) offi-
cial action violative of due process. See, e.g., State v.
Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963), where the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island applied the Wong Sun rule with-
out discussion.
Moreover, state courts must now exclude incriminat-
ing pre-indictment statements made by a defendant
during a time when his right to counsel was being vio-
lated. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
28 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (published confession never
offered as evidence); ef. People v. Bromme, 56 Cal. 2d
629, 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 913, 364 P.2d 845, 849
(1961) (published confession erroneously admitted).
In a poll of lawyers, police officials and newsmen.
taken by this writer, 41.94% of the 124 persons re-
sponding cited publication of confessions as being the
kind of material most likely to be harmful to a criminal
defendant. See Table IX, in Part II of this article, and
the Explanatory Note to the appendices & tables in
Part II.
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contenderO9 are tantamount to reports that he has
admitted guilt, and thus should be treated the
same as publicity concerning confessions. It would
be extremely naive to expect a juror who has read
or heard a statement referring to a defendant as a
"confessed killer," or has read or heard that a de-
fendant has confessed or the purported contents of
his confession, to put this out of his mind merely
because no confession was admitted in evidence
and he was told to consider only evidence ad-
mitted in court.
That in many cases confessions are properly
admitted does not in any way vitiate the prejudice
suffered by the defendant whose confession, though
not admitted in evidence, was publicized. Nor can
the general pre-admission publication of confes-
sions be justified by maintaining that it would
serve to relieve the public hysteria which often
follows an unsolved crime of violence, unless we are
willing to cite the desire for public complacency
as a rationale for the denial of a fundamental
constitutional right.3 0
(2) Prior criminal activities. Evidence of a de-
fendant's alleged criminal activities unrelated to
the crime for which he is being tried is ordinarily
inadmissible in court.
"The state may not show defendant's prior
trouble with the law [or] specific criminal acts...
even though such facts might logically be per-
suasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not re-
jected because character [as evidenced by prior
criminal activities] is irrelevant; on the contrary,
it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to
so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record and deny him a fair oppor-
tunity to defend against a particular charge."3u
Unless one of the few exceptions to this general
rule can be invoked, admission of such evidence
constitutes prejudicial, reversible error.n For ex-
29 See, e.g., Hammons v. People, 385 P.2d 592, 594
(Colo. 1963).30 However, this desire may warrant such a rationale
in a truly exceptional case. See text in Section IX, infra.31 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76
(1948).
1 Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible against a
defendant unless offered for certain specified purposes.
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901);
McCoxucx, EVIDENcE §157 (1954); Comment, Ad-
mitting Evidence of Prior Sex Offenses-A New Trend,
58 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 108 (1963). Prior convictions are ad-
missible only for purposes of impeachment. Mc-
Cop.scx, EvIDENcE §43 (1954). In a few jurisdictions,
the fact that a defendant has been arrested, State v.
Christofaro, 70 R.I. 57, 37 A.2d 163 (1944), or indicted,
ample, in a rather extreme holding, the Fourth
Circuit recently granted a state convict's petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that the jury's
improper knowledge of defendant's prior convic-
tions in and of itself constituted a denial of his
federal constitutional right to a fair trial."
Since evidence of prior arrests, convictions, and
pending indictments and accusations of crimes un-
related to the offense charged are all likely to cause
the jury, probably through conscious or subcon-
scious use of a "leopard never changes its spots"
thought process, to believe that defendant com-
mitted the crime charged, publication of such
material is reasonably certain to be prejudicial if
not later admitted.
(3) Incriminating tangible evidence. No criminal
defendant can be convicted by means of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against unreasonable search and seizure.1 If
the fact that incriminating tangible evidence has
been discovered is published in such a way that
the defendant is connected with the commission of
a crime, he will be prejudiced unless the evidence
is found to have been lawfully obtained and is
admitted against him at the trial. A defendant can
be equally prejudiced by such publicity concern-
ing tangible evidence which may prove inadmis-
sible by reason of some non-constitutional evi-
dentiary rule.3 5 If, however, the discovery of
evidence is publicized without connecting any
State v. Goodwin, 29 Wash. 2d 276, 186 P.2d 935 (1947),
is admissible to impeach him; but by the general rule,
only prior convictions can so be used. Pearson v. United
States, 192 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1951). Admission of facts
concerning arrest for an offense other than that for
which defendant is presently on trial is prejudicial error.
Id. at 698. Even in a jurisdiction where evidence of
arrest or indictment is admissible for purposes of im-
peachment, publication of such facts pnor to the prose-
cution's opportunity to impeach defendant would be
prejudicial to defendant if he does not later testify.
For cases involving the publication of inadmissible
facts re criminal activities, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d
133 (7th Cir. 1962); Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d
8 (8th Cir. 1954); Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d
904 (6th Cir. 1953); Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d
523 (8th Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Brown v.
Smith, 200 F. Supp. 385 (D. Vt. 1962); State v. Halko,
193 A.2d 817 (Del. 1963); Commonwealth v. Crehan,
345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963); State v. La-
Rocca, 81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (App. Div.
1963); State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 863-65, 385
P.2d 18, 22-24 (1963). 32.26% of the persons respond-
ing to the writer's poll deemed publication of such in-
formation a type most likely to be harmful. See Table
IX, in Part II of this article.
3 Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
4 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 See notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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particular person to the crime, it is not prejudicial
to a defendant even if, for some reason, the evi-
dence is not subsequently admitted. For example,
if police discover the "murder weapon," publica-
tion of that fact alone would not be prejudicial,
while publication of the fact that they found it in
the possession of the defendant would be.
(4) Statements of persons who may not actually
testify. Since every criminal defendant has a federal
constitutional right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine his accusers, 36 a defendant may be
prejudiced for inability to exercise this right if the
news media publish an extra-judicial statement
made by a person not subsequently called as a
witness against him. Such statements may inde-
pendently tend to lead a juror to believe that the
defendant committed the crime charged, e.g.,
statements of "experts" regarding the results of
polygraph tests, ballistics tests, and other scientific
evidence, identification by "eye-witnesses," state-
ments of official opinion that defendant is guilty,
statements which might not qualify as dying
declarations, and the like; or, such statements
could reasonably tend to discredit an accused's
possible defense without actually incriminating
him, e.g., statements impeaching the credibility of
defense witnesses, or indicating that a defendant
pleading insanity is actually sane.
(5) Reports of proceedings from which the jury has
been excluded. Since a judge's exclusion of the jury
from a court proceeding is generally based on the
probability that the proceeding will contain infor-
mation the jury is not entitled to know, publica-
tion of occurrences which take place during such
proceedings is very likely to be prejudicial to a
defendant. Most proceedings of this nature are
hearings at which the trial court rules on the ad-
missibility of evidence or confessions. Only if and
when the evidence or confession is admitted can
the proceedings on which that determination was
based be published without probable prejudice to
the defendant.-
"' U.S.. Cors. amend. VI, applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). "[Due process re-
quires] that no person shall be tried and convicted of an
offense unless he is... afforded an opportunity to
examine adverse witnesses." Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). See State v. Swenson, 62
Wash. 2d 259, 382 P.2d 614 (1963); Pettit v. Rhay,
62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963). 14.52% of the
persons responding considered publicity of this type
most likely to be harmful to a defendant. See Table IX,
in Part II of this article.
31 See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504
(6) Miscellaneous inflammnatory material. Ma-
terial in this category may consist of "human
interest" interviews with the victim or his family,
publication of the fact that a niurder victim's
estate is to be disposed of, editorials or factual
reports concerning a "crime wave," or reports of
the greater deterrent nature of capital punishment
as compared with prison sentences.n This type of
material tends to be inflammatory-that is, to
cause the jury to want to convict-and thus to be
prejudicial to whomever happens to be the defend-
ant, not because he is any particular person about
whom publicity has been disseminated, but merely
because he is the defendant. For example, members
of the jury which found a defendant guilty of
murder and sentenced him to 299 years in prison
later admitted that they had been influenced by
articles concerning the then-pending proposed pa-
role of Nathan Leopold.39
It can be argued that, since material of the
kinds enumerated tends to disclose The Truth,
their publication should be encouraged. However,
even if a coerced confession is true, and even if
unconstitutionally seized evidence would conclu-
sively establish a defendant's guilt, the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court will permit no state or fed-
eral court in America to convict on such evidence.
While conceding that evidence of previous criminal
activities is not irrelevant and, in fact, is inde-
pendently probative of present guilt, courts gener-
ally refuse to admit such evidence because of its
extremely prejudicial nature. Surely only a per-
verted form of justice would permit jurors to be
aware via news media of information which that
same justice forbids those jurors to take cognizance
of in open court.
III: ExIsTING METHODS
Accepting the above general definition of prej-
udicial publicity and tentative characterization of
specific kinds of material which may be prejudicial,
we must now examine the means which have been
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961);
Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 997 (1952); People v. Lambright, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 851, 856-58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
18 See, e.g., People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d 323, 332-42,
33 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963).
11 Interview with Gerald Getty, Public Defender,
Cook County, Ill., April 16, 1962. See also State v.
Arrington, - Mo. App. -, 375 S.W.2d 186
(1964) (publicity of case similar to defendant's); Ex
parle Pineda, - Tex. Crim. - , 373 S.W.2d 689
(1964) (adverse publicity re defendant's counsel).
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used in an attempt to prevent defendants from
being convicted by juries influenced by such ma-
terial. In evaluating each method, its effect upon
each of the three co-existing interests-of the de-
fendant, the government, and the news media-
will be considered.
Methods currently available to American courts
for the purpose of attempting to solve the free
press-fair trial dilemma are: (1) issuing contempt
citations against those responsible for publication
of prejudicial information; (2) granting of trial
level procedural reliefs designed to prevent a biased
jury from rendering a verdict; (3) use of caution-
ary instructions to prevent or erase the harmful
effects of prejudicial publicity; and (4) reversing
convictions resulting from trials unfair because of
prejudicial publicity.
(1) Contempt citations
Contempt citations against those responsible for
the publication of prejudicial information have
been little used by American courts because of
their general reluctance to apply the doctrine of
constructive contempt. 40 Used with much success
in Great Britian," this doctrine allows a court to
punish as contempt any act which interferes with
40E.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941),
overruling Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U.S. 403 (1918), construed 28 U.S.C. §385 to cover, as
punishable contempts, only acts committed in the
court's immediate presence or so geographically near
thereto as to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice. Accord, Rees v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 864
(D. Md. 1961), construing 18 U.S.C. §401 (1958). See
generally GoLFARB, TnE CONTEMPT PoWER 89-100
(1963); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 20
Couxx. L. Rxv. 525, 530 (1928). See also McGuigan,
Crime Reporting: The British and American Approaches,
50 A.B.A.J. 442 (1964). But narrow construction of a
statutory contempt power may not affect the court's in-
herent contempt power. See, e.g., In re Simmons, 248
Mich. 297, 300-01, 226 N.W. 907, 908 (1929).
41 See Speiser, Trial Topics, The Ward Trial and the
Press, 68 Case & Com. 12 (Nov.-Dec. 1963). Only the
fact of arrest and matters concerning pre-trial pro-
cedure can be published before conclusion of the trial.
See generally Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 338
U.S. 912, 921-36 (1950) (appendix to opinion of Frank-
furter, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 15 (Fla. 1959);
Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English
Law, 48 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1935); Laski, Procedure
for Constructive Contempt in England, 41 HARV. L. REv.
1031 (1928). In response to the question what kinds of
material are most likely to harm a criminal defendant,
25% of the persons responding in effect stated that only
such matters as can be published under the English
system are not likely to be harmful if published before
admission as evidence at the trial. See Table IV, in Part
II of this article.
proceedings before it even though that act did not
take place in or in the immediate vicinity of the
court .2
Perhaps the reason for rejection of this concept is
that constructive contempt is almost invariably
committed by publication,43 and its exercise is re-
garded by the press, radio, and television" as vio-
lative of the federal constitutional guarantee that
neither federal nor state action may abridge free-
dom of speech and of the press.45 While freedom of
the press protects almost absolutely against prior
restraint,"4 the government may take corrective
action to punish past misconduct--such as issuing
4
2 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 40, at 77-89; Su-i-
vAN, CoNTxrs By PUBLiCATiON 6 (2d ed. 1940);
Goldfarb, Ensuring Fair Trials: The Impropriety of
Publicity, The New Republic, Feb. 29, 1964, p. 11.
. 41 Contempts by publication have as a matter of
custom been called constructive contempts, and the
term is almost one of special connotation. Non-direct
contempts other than press contempt cases, such as at-
tempted bribery of a witness or juror, are referred to as
indirect contempts. GomFAr.B, op. cit. supra note 40,
at 69.
"The first amendment's express guarantee of free-
dom of speech and of the press has been construed to
extend to radio, Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193
Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950), and motion pictures, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and most certainly, there-
fore, extends to television, as well, though no case re-
garding television has come to the writer's attention.
45 Federal: U.S. CONST. amend. I. State: "[Lliberty of
the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment from invasion by state action .... ." Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); see also id. at
716-20. Accord, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 372
(1927) (concurring opinion); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (leading case). "
46 "[Tihe protection even as to prior restraint is not
absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recog-
nized only in exceptional cases." Near v. Minnesota,
supra note 45, at 716. Accord, Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). But see Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), which indicates
that prior restraint of motion pictures in nonexcep-
tional cases is not unconstitutional per se, and may be
unobjectionable if definite standards and fair pur-
cedures are employed. For the view that freedom of the
press prohibits only prior restraint, see Sur.lvAN, CON-
TEMPTS By P BiCATION 165 (2d ed. 1940); StouLrvAN,
TRIAL By NEWSPAPER 245-46 (1961).
In the Near case, supra, the Court held that a statute
which deemed any publication of a defamatory or
malicious nature a nuisance was an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press. The
crux of the decision was that the statute, although pur-
portedly describing a corrective process, operated in
such a way as to amount to prior restraint, inasmuch as
a violation of the injunction against the nuisance was
punishable as a criminal contempt. Four Justices dis-
sented on the ground that the statute was not a prior
restraint.
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a contempt dtation4-if, under the circumstances,
the words uttered or published create a "clear and
present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress [or the state] has a
right to prevent."43 Interference with the fair ad-
ministration of justice, such as by publication of
material which presents a clear and present danger
to the fairness of a particular trial, is an evil which
the government has a right to prevent. Freedom of
the press has been held subject to restriction where
there was a clear and present danger that its exercise
would cause serious political, economic, or moral
injury to the government, 49 would impede the
performance of governmental duties,0 or would
endanger the foundations of organized govern-
ment. -1 A fair judicial system surely is one of the
foundations of our government, and maintenance
of such a system a governmental duty. The United
States Supreme Court has expressly recognized
"the conceded authority of courts to punish for
contempt when publications directly tend to pre-
vent the proper discharge of judicial functions."12
The Supreme Court, though, has never affirmed
a contempt citation issued for a contempt com-
mitted by publication. However, in reversing three
cases in which newspapers had been held in con-
tempt for the publication of prejudicial material,m
the Court based its decisions not on the per se
invalidity of holding newspapers in contempt, but
rather on the absence of a "clear and present
danger" to the orderly administration of the judi-
cial process in the cases in question. It should be
noted that these three cases were not tried before
47 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Consensus of Reform of
Sensational Reporting, 20 J. Am. Jim. Soc'y 83, 84
(1936) (quoting from Address by Frank J. Hogan).
Although citing for contempt is, as a matter of form, a
corrective process, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that, in effect, such process may amount
to unconstitutional prior censorship.
"[The question is to what extent the judgments of
contempt] as a practical matter ... would affect the
liberty of expression.... [A]nyone who might wish
to give public expression to his views on a pending
case.., would be as effectively discouraged as if a
deliberate statutory scheme of censorship had been
adopted."
Bridges v. California, supra : t 268-69 (majority
opinion).
8 Schenck v. Uaited States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
49 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(concurring opinion of Brandeis, ).
60 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S 652, 667 (1925).
51 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
62 Near v. Min, -sota, 283 U.S. 679, 715 (1931).
" Craig v. Har.,ey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (19,).
juries. It has been suggested that the danger of
impeding the judicial process via prejudicial publi-
cations is substantially lessened where the case is
tried by a judge, a law-trained mimn regarded as
capable of being objective, rather than before a
jury of impressionable laymen.M In Wood v. Geor-
gia,55 a recent contempt by publication case in-
volving publication of a sheriff's statements de-
signed to influence a grand jury, the United States
Supreme Court reversed for lack of a clear and
present danger, noting that the instant case did not
involve a criminal trial pending before a jury.56
This dictum indicates that, presented the proper
case of dissemination of prejudicial material re-
garding a criminal case pending before a jury, the
Supreme Court would affirm a contempt convic-
tion.
The purpose of freedom of the press is to "assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of social changes desired by the people,"n7
and this right thus is essential to our system of
government. Arguably, only publications consis-
tent with the legitimate purpose of freedom of the
press are entitled to its full protection., In an
analogous situation, freedom of the press does not
extend to confidential government documents, 9
since disclosure to the press of secret government
information could seriously undermine the ability
of the various branches of government in discharg-
ing their consfitutionally defined responsibilities.69
5 Cf. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 861, 863
(D. Md. 1961).
65 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
16 Id. at 389-90.57 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
"The importance of this [freedom of the press] con-
sists... in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government, its ready communi-
cation of thoughts, between subjects, and its conse-
quential promotion of union among them, whereby
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into
more honourable and just modes of conducting
affairs."3
Ibid. [Citing 1 JouRAs oF =x CONTNXNFAL CON-
GREss 108 (1774).1
" "Because freedom of public expression alone as-
sures the unfolding of truth, it is indispensible to the
democratic process." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 293 (1941) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
eloquently though he may extoll the necessity of free-
dom of the press, as in the above quotation, recognizes
that this freedom must not be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the fair administration cf the judi-
cial system. See, e.g., quotation in text at note 61 infra.
9 See, e.g., Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651
(D.D.C. 1959).
&Old. at 656. See Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12
DEPAUL L. Rxv. 197, 200-01 (1963). Cohen, A Frec
1951
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Use of the freedom of the press which results in the
denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial and
prejudices the outcome of a criminal case seems a
perverted exercise of that right, and repugnant to
its purpose. For example, consider Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's pointed observation:
"In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution
hardly meant to create the right to influence
judges or juries. That is no more freedom of
speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exericse
of the right to vote."6'
The fair comment which serves the purpose of
freedom of the press does not include material
published with the intent to influence the result of
a criminal trial.u Moreover, material published
without such intent but nonetheless reasonably
certain to have that incidental effect constitutes a
"dear and present danger" under a fair interpre-
tation of that test, since the danger lies in the
probable effect of publication.u
Use of the contempt power to punish a contempt
committed by publication of prejudicial material
would seem to be -constitutional so long as the
clear and present danger test was met, because the
action would not impose prior restraint, and the
publication would be of a nature inconsistent with
the purpose of freedom of the press.5 '
Another reason for judicial reluctance to exercise
the inherent contempt power may rest upon the
position of most of our judges as elected officials
Press Vs. Fair Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July 5, 1964,
sec. 2, p. 3.
" Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946)
(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
82 See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 278 (1923)
(concurring opinion of Taft, C.J.). Cf. Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946); id. at 365 (concurring opinion
of Frankfurter, J.); SuLiVAN, CoNrEmaps By PUBLI-
CATION 176 (2d ed. 1940); SuLLrVAN, TRIAL By N ws-
PAPER 211-24 (1961).
63 See Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300,
331, 61 A.2d 497, 511 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950), where the Maryland Court indicates that mate-
rial published or broadcast without intent to influence
the result could constitute a "clear and present danger."
Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(espionage), where pamphlets intended to aid the Rus-
sian Revolution, but necessarily having the incidental
effect of harming the United States' war effort, were
held to constitute a punishable "clear and present
danger."
" Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(freedom of speech does not protect obscenity). 41.94%
of the persons responding thought the contempt power
could be used. Of those responding that it could not,
only 40.68% based their answer on grounds of unconsti-
tutionality. See Tables I & III, in Part II of this
article.
dependent on the press for political support.6" A
further reason may be judicial ignorance that the
inherent contempt power extends beyond the
power to cite for contempt those who scandalize
the court. 66
Although it is essential to our system of govern-
ment that no person be convicted but by an im-
partial jury, it is just as essential that no organ of
public sentiment be effectively prohibited from
making fair comment on that government. Only
publications not constituting fair comment as de-
fined above would be contemptuous, but limited
restrictions with fair and reasonable beginnings
may eventually compound into an oppressive
whole. Use of the contempt power may thus pro-
jectively undermine freedom of the press even if it
would not presently violate that freedom.
-Furthermore, what does it help a particular
convicted defendant that the newspaper which
helped to convict him has been held in contempt?
And future defendants will not be aided by present
contempt citations unless definitive standards of
contemptuous conduct are established; in absence
of such standards, punishment for contempt lacks
deterrent effect.Y The prosecuting government's
interests are also neglected by use of the contempt
65 "The election of... judges for short terms obvi-
ously made them subservient to press requirements."
Editorial, Publicity Scandals Demand Eercise of Au-
thority, 20 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 82, 83 (1936). "The reason
why... [the courts] fear the power of newspapers is
because that power is political power .... [T]he popular
election of judges for fixed terms is the greatest single
evil of our judicial system." Perry, The Courts, The
Press, and The Publi; 30 MIcH. L. REv. 228, 234
(1931). "[There is a widespread and firmly established
system of trading official information and official favor
for newspaperpublicity and newspaper influence.... It
is precisely and definitely from this system that the evil
of trial by newspaper derives." Id. at 233. Of the per-
sons responding that the contempt power could not be
used, 23.73% based their answer on this political
reason. See Table IM, in Part II of this article.
6 SULLIVAN, CONTEmPTs By PUBLICATION 126-30
(2d ed. 1940).
67Cf. In the Matter of Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251
N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931). The New York Su-
preme Court cited a news photographer for contempt
after having been advised that an explosion ensued at a
criminal trial when he attempted to take a photograph.
Finding Seed guilty of contempt but discharging him in
light of his lack of knowledge of the illegality of his con-
duct, the court stated:
"[This occurrence and similar ones] have been
brought about by a lack of knowledge on the part of
those seeking to obtain the pictures as to their rights
and... duties toward the court. This memorandum
is written with the thought that the information
therein contained will lead to a proper conduct on the
part of those seeking to take pictures in the vicinity
of the court."
Id. at 684, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 618.
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power, because so long as this process is not uni-
formly applied according to some standards, it
serves no deterrent function and thus does not
tend to help secure the effective enforcement of
justice in the long run.
(2) Trial level remedies
Various remedies designed to prevent a defend-
ant from being tried by a prejudiced jury are
available at the trial level. Included are motions
for dismissal of a prospective' or impanelled 69
juror for cause, for declaration of mistrial 7 0 for
continuance,7 1 for change of venue,72 and for new
trial. Failure to grant the requested relief is re-
6s E.g., Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
0 E.g., United States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1949); United States
v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 787 (1946).70E.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959); Copnedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), "cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961); State v.
Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779 (1963); Hammons
v. People, - Colo. -, 385 P.2d 592 (1963); Com-
monwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923
(1963); People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d
419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963); State v. Harris, 62 Wash.
2d 858, 385 P.2d 18 (1963).
In State v. Puckett, supra, the trial court (sitting
without a jury) declared a mistrial sua sponte upon pub-
lication of an article declaring that the judge's decision
in the case would be politically influenced. Defendant
challenged retrial on double jeopardy grodnds. The
Arizona Supreme Court held that the new trial did not
constitute double jeopardy, inasmuch as the trial court
had a "legal reason" for declaring the mistrial.71 E.g., United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345,
349-53 (7th Cir. 1963); Delaney v. United States, 199
F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921,
370 S.W.2d 613 (1963); State v. Hickock, 188 Kan.
473, 363 P.2d 541 (1961); State v. St. Peter, 63
Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937 (1963).
12 E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963); United
States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.
1963); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir.
1963); United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D.
Minn. 1963); People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d 443,
472-74, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 677-78 (1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 925, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964);
Singer v.. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959); Blevins v.
State, 108 Ga. App. 738, 134 S.E.2d 496 (1963);
Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172, 84 S.E.2d 365 (1954);
Nickell v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902. 903-04
(Ky. 1962); State v. Thompson, - Minn.._.._, 123
N.W.2d 378 (1963); State v. Odom, - Mo. ., 369
S.W.2d 173 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964);
Hagans v. State, - Tea. Crim. -, -, 372
S.W.2d 946, 948 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964); Crouse v.
State, - Wyo. -,.. 384 P.2d 321, 331 (1963).
73E.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);
State v. Halko, - Del. -, 193 A.2d 817 (1963).
versible error only where a defendant has been
prejudiced thereby and where such failure amounts
to an abuse of discretion. 4 However, these remedies
fail to protect defendants' rights and the corollary
sovereign rights simply because they are so seldom
granted,7 15 probably due to the nebulous nature of
impartiality76 and the trial court's broad discretion
as to disposition of such motions.7 Another reason
these procedures are ineffective is that, if granted,
such remedies as change of venue, continuance,
and even new trial, will be unable to assure a fair
trial if widespread and intense publicity concern-
ing the trial continues to be disseminated.3 Even
74 An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's
finding of impartiality unless error is so manifest as to
amount to an abuse of discretion, Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Dillon v. United States, 218
F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1955); Singer v. State, 109 So.
2d 7, 13 (Fla. 1959), apparently because the trial judge
is presumed to be in a better position than is the appel-
late court to weigh all the factors in determining the
question of what effect, if any, publication of prejudicial
information has upon the fairness of a given trial. Com-
monwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 501, 508, 159
N.E.2d 870, 881, 885, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959)
(Brinks' robbery case). Since determination of whether
or not to grant the various motions depends on a finding
of partiality or no partiality, appellate courts allow trial
courts that same broad discretion as to disposition of
the motions.75 Address by Mr. James R. Thompson, Assistant
States Attorney, Cook County, Ill., Conference on Pre-
judicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, Northwest-
ern Univ. School of Law, May 3, 1962, in Fr PRESs-
FAIR TRIAL: A. R-aToR oP = PEocEEDiNGs or A
CoNrE- cE oN PRE uDicrAL NEWS REPORTING IN
CRsnaAL CASES 7, 12-15 (Inbau ed. 1964); Address by
Mr. James R. Thompson, Second Annual Short Course
for Newsmen in Crime News Analysis and Reporting,
Northwestern Univ. School of Law, Summer 1960, in
INBAU & SowLE, CamxmA JusTIcE 810, 813 (1960);
Will, supra note 60, at 209 n.39.
76 See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
77 See note 74 supra.
78 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
remedies of continuance and change of venue not only
would be to no avail [Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339
Mass. 487 501 159 N.E.2d 870, 881, cert. denied, 361
U.S. 895 (1959 , wherein the argument was advanced
that since the prejudice engendered was so strong and
widespread that no fair trial which properly could be
called "speedy" could be had anywhere in the Com-
monwealth, defendants could never be constitutionally.
tried in Massachusetts], but also would entail waiver of
the constitutional right to a speedy trial in the county
where the alleged crime was committed. Address by
Mr. James R. Thompson, Second Annual Short Course,
supra note 75.
Of course, the perils of being tried by a biased jury
would disappear if a defendant were to elect to be tried
by the court alone, assuming that judges are immune to
prejudice. But this constitutes waiver of the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury. "A citizen should not be
coerced to relinquish his right to a jury trial.., in
order to escape an intolerable situation of a trial before
a prejudiced jury." Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 486,
45 A.2d 350, 352 (1945).
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when granted, these motions have little tendency
to deter future publication of prejudicial material.
It would appear that the trial level technique
of sequestering the jury (i.e., keeping the jurors
"locked up" during the course of the trial) is the
most effective way to prevent the defendant's being
prejudiced by publicity appearing after the jury
has been impanelled. 79 This method has been in-
frequently employed, however, perhaps because of
a desire to avoid coercing the unhappily confined
jurors to concur in a hurried verdict. However in
a recent case the Seventh Circuit approved the
trial judge's sua sponte sequestration of the jury
for the purpose of protecting defendant from the
effects of prejudicial publicity over defendant's
contention that this action resulted in a coerced
verdict against him.80 Furthermore, sequestration
requires large expenditures by the state.81
(3) Cautionary instructions
Where the trial court instructs the jury not to
read or listen to accounts of the case which may
appear during the course of the trial8 or not to
consider any matters other than evidence presented
at the trial,5V appellate courts generally presume
that the instructions were effective and thus find
no prejudice due to pre-trial publicity or publicity
appearing during the trial accordingly, failure to
79 E.g., in the recent Hoffa criminal fraud trial, Judge
Richard B. Austin, N.D. Ill., sequestered the jury. In
this case, however, the reason for sequestration appears
to have been not only to insulate against the effects of
prejudicial publicity but also to prevent interests
representing the defendant from contacting jurors for
the purpose of threatening or bribing them.
80 United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 349-
53 (7th Cir. 1963).
st See Will, supra note 60, at 209 n.39.
82 Termed preventive cautionary instructions.
8 Termed corrective cautionary instructions.
SE.g., Preventive: Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d
.260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956); Correc-
tive: United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d
Cir. 1951) (article found in jury room, corrective cau-
tionary instructions presumed effective); United States
v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
952 (1949) (no proof that any juror read article);
United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946) (one juror saw
article, but no proof of prejudice); Hammons v. People,
385 P.2d 592, 594-95 (Colo. 1963) (general corrective
cautionary instruction presumed effective to cure any
prejudice caused by news report of defendant's offer to
plead nolo contendere); State v. Cox, 188 Kan. 500, 501,
363 P.2d 528, 529 (1963) (corrective cautionary instruc-
tion presumed to have cured prejudicial effects of radio
broadcast); Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609.
188 N.E.2d 923 (1963) (general corrective cautionary
instruction ineffective to cure prejudice).
However, current thinking in the behavioral sciences
give cautionary instructions has been held to con-
stitute reversible error.86
However, for several reasons, preventive cau-
tionary instructions nonetheless fail to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial and the sovereign's
right to preserve the orderly administration of
justice by giving him a fair trial. First, they cannot
protect against the possible effects of pre-trial
publicity, simply because of the time element.
Second, jurors may disregard preventive caution-
ary instructions and fail to admit it for fear of
reprisal by the court. For example, in Smith v.
United'States,86 a prejudicial article was published
after cautionary instructions had been given..
Upon defense counsel's request that despite the
instructions the jury be polled as to whether any
had read the article, the court addressed the jury
as a whole as follows: " 'fllf any juror violated the
instructions of the court and read the article...
hold up your hands.' ,,7 A better procedure involv-
ing the private interrogation of individual jurors
is outlined by Judge Kiley in United States v.
AccardoPs Third, these instructions may call to a
juror's attention articles which might otherwise
have gone unnoticed8 9 Corrective cautionary in-
is that the human mind is inexorably affected by im-
pressions lodged in the subconscious. See note 90 infra.
86 E.g., Preventive: United States v. Accardo, 298
F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962) (general preventive cau-
tionary instructions inadequate); Coppedge v. United
States, 272 F.2d 504, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961) (trial court under duty to
give preventive cautionary instructions); Carter v.
United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (failure to
give preventive cautionary instruction reversible error
though actual prejudice Isee note 13 supra] not shown);
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952)
(failure to give preventive cautionary instructions
rendered subsequent corrective cautionary instructions
ineffective); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636
(6th Cir. 1955) (publication during trial, no request by
defendant for instruction); Corrective: King v. United
States, 25 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1928) (trial court
under duty to give cautionary instructions when articles
appear); People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d. 323, 332-42, 33
Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963)
(trial court's failure to give specific corrective caution-
ary instruction amounted to approval of prosecutor's
argument re prejudicial publicity).
86 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909
(1956), rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
87 Id. at 269-70.
88 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
11 See Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639
(6th Cir. 1955); Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904,
909 (6th Cir. 1953). Judge Julius J. Hoffman, N.D. Ill.,
has told the writer that subsequent to decision of the
Accardo appeal, supra note 88, which in effect requires
district judges in the Seventh Circuit to give preventive
cautionary instructions before every recess, a number of
defense attorneys have waived the right to such in-
structions, specifically requesting that they not be
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z-tructions are likely to be ineffective for the third
reason above, and also because of the difficulty, if
not impossibility, for a juror not to be at least
subconsciously influenced by extra-judicial mat-
ters to which he was exposed despite honest efforts
to remain fair and impartial and to discharge his
oath. 0
Exposure to extra-judicial matters not in evi-
dence at the trial may cause a juror subconsciously
to resolve disputed issues of fact against the de-
fendant even though that juror is not in fact decid-
ing defendant's guilt on the basis of consciously
considered facts gained other than at the trial.
Moreover, extra-judicial exposure to matters which
are subsequently admitted in evidence may lead a
sincere juror to resolve disputed issues of fact, and,
perhaps more importantly, issues of credibility of
witnesses, against defendant. The pre-admission
exposure may well cause a juror to give more
weight to the evidence than he would if his first
and only contact with the matter were as evidence
in court.
(4) Reversal of Convictions
Many factors are considered by reviewing courts
in determining whether a judgment of conviction
should be overturned on prejudicial publicity
grounds. Invariably the reversible error alleged by
appellant will be denial of a fair trial occasioned
by the trial court's failure or refusal to grant trial
level remedies or cautionary instructions. Hence,
the issues reviewing courts discuss tend to establish
the p;esence or absence of prejudice.
State or Federal Convicting Court. The question
whether the conviction was rendered in a state or
federal court is peculiar to the federal courts, since
given so that the jurors will not be curious to read
what they would have been warned against.
90 See note 11 supra and acc6mpanying text. It should
be noted that, even though one may not be consciously
influenced by prior exposure to prejudicial publicity in
the task of arriving at a verdict, he may in fact be un-
able to put the extra-judicially acquired material out of
his mind and' thus may subconsciously utilize it in
reaching his verdict while sincerely believing that he is
deciding 'the case objectively and "solely on the basis
of the evidence presented in court." For discussion of
the subtle machinations of prior experience, see, e.g.,
KRECH & CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 87 (1948); TOLMAN, PuRposIvE
BEHAVIOR IN ANmLs AND MEN 394 (1932); Siipola, A
Study of Some E17ects of Preparatory Set, in HARTLEY,
OtrrsmE READINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY 266-75 (1950);
WICKENS & MEYER, PSYCHOLOGY 276-85 (1961);
Eckstrand & Wickens, Transfer of Perceptual Set, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 274 (1954). See also Com-
ment, Prejudice and the Administratire Process, 59
Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1964).
only a federal court can hear cases which originate
in both federal and state courts.0' If the conviction
was rendered in a federal court, the United States
Supreme Court can reverse in exercise of its general
supervisory power over the lower federal courts.92
When a federal court is reviewing a state convic-
tion, however, habeas corpus can be granted 93 or
reversal ordered94 only if the defendant was denied
a fair trial in violation of due process.9 - However,
the fact that the 1963 case of Rideau v. Louisiana
9
6
allowed speculative proof of prejudice to establish
that the constitutionally compelled impartiality
requirement was not met by the state jury indi-
cates that the state-federal distinction will seldom
be meaningful in cases to come.
Admissibility of Information Complained of.
Publicity relating facts unfavorable to a defendant
which are inadmissible as evidence at the trial is
very likely to be prejudicial, since a juror who
reads such publicity will have been exposed to
evidence not introduced at the trial, and might
consider such facts in his deliberations.9 Con-
91 For example, a federal district court may review a
state conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding, and a
federal appellate court may review a district court's
decision on a habeas petition. The United States
Supreme Court may have occasion to review a state
conviction directly.
92 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959). The Court reversed and granted a new trial in
exercise of its "supervisory power to formulate and
apply proper stkndards for enforcement of the criminal
law in the federal courts." Id. at 313. Although such
supervisory power is initially exercised to correct preju-
dicial error, application of rules so formulated may re-
sult in reversal where a defendant was not in fact prej-
udiced, but where such circumstances as were present at
his trial may, in other cases, result in prejudice.
91 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), United States
ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963),
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964),
and United States ex ret. Smith v. Brown, 200 F. Supp.
885 (D. Vt. 1962), appear to be the only cases to date
wherein federal habeas corpus issued to a state prisoner
on this ground.
94 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the
Supreme Court's latest state prejudicial publicity case,
came up on certiorari.
15 Our "dual sovereignty" system of federalism, based.
on the tenth amendment, permits a federal court to
overturn a state conviction only if it was obtained in a
manner repugnant to the defendant's federal constitu-
tional rights.
11 Supra note 94. See note 17 supra and accompany-
ing text.
97 Mashall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959)
(seven jurors saw articles re fact of prior convictions,
previously held inadmissible at trial-rev'd); Shepherd
v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (rev'd per curiam on
other grounds) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.)
(article stated defendants had confessed; no confes-
sions offered as evidence); United States v. Accardo, 298
F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (publication of inadmissible
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versely, if information published prior to trial is
subsequently admitted, defendant cannot success-
fully allege that the publicity prejudiced his
rights 9 The rule in the federal courts, controlled
by Marshall v. United States,99 requires reversal
where the jury was extra-judicially aware of infor-
mation inadmissible because of its prejudicial na-
ture,100 not simply because of some evidentiary
rule.'
0'
evidence re criminal activities-rev'd); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) (publication
of inadmissible evidence-rev'd); People v. Purvis, 60
Cal. 2d 323,332-42,33 Cal. Rptr. 104,110-16,384 P. 2d
424, 430-36 (1963) (publication of inflammatory, inad-
missible information re capital punishment-rev'd);
Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d
923 (Mass. 1963) (publication by three major local
newspapers of fact that trial judge requested them not
to print defendants' criminal records-rev'd).
9s Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952)
(text of confesion published before trial, confession
latcr admitted as evidence-aff'd); United States v.
Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) (publicity
circulated during trial contained no material not even-
tually admitted as evidence-motions for new trial or
for acquittal denied).
It may be argued nevertheless that a prejudicial effect
existed. Even if the contents (substance) of the pub-
licity were later admitted in evidence, it would appear
that a defendant could still be prejudiced, inasmuch as
a jury might well be more likely to believe the prosecu-
tion's evidence after having been conditioned to it by
the pre-trial publicity. See note 90 supra. Even if
jurors follow instructions not to read material about the
case, this cannot erase the effects of impressions formed
derived from exposure to pre-trial publicity. See notes
82-90 supa and accompanying text.
The elusive nature of impartiality renders even the
factor of subsequent admission of the evidence incon-
clusive, since the fact that evidence inadmissible be-
cause of its prejudicial nature was perceived by the jury
does not technically render a trial unfair unless the jury
is found partial under the particular test of impartiality
applied. For example, where all jurors, upon interroga-
tion by the trial court, stated that they had not been
prejudiced against defendant by a news article pub-
lished during the trial referring to him as an "ex-con-
vict," the court's finding of no prejudice was affirmed in
Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950).
A conviction was affirmed for lack of a finding of par-
tiality where there was no proof that any juror had read
an article published during the trial which contained
the fact of defendant's pending trial for another offense,
and where a cautionary instruction had been given ad-
monishing the jury to consider only evidence admitted
at the trial. United States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950).
99 360 U.S. 310 (1959). See text accompanying notes
21 & 22 supra.
100 The crux of the Marshall decision is that the jurors
were exposed to "information of a character which the
trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be di-
rectly offered as evidence." Id. at 312.
Relying on Marshall, the Court of Appeals in Cop-
pedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961), reversed a conviction
handed down by a jury which might have read articles
containing accounts of transactions which occurred in
Time Between Publication and Trial. Although it
is difficult to measure so subjective a thing as im-
partiality-admittedly a state of mind-on an ob-
jective scale, some courts have attempted to do so.
If a relatively long period of time has elapsed be-
tween publication of the material complained of
and time of trial, a reviewing court is not likely to
find prejudice.'t
Action Taken by Defense Counsel Prior to or
During Trial. If defense counsel fails to move the
court to interrogate the prospective jurors on voir
dire, or the impanelled jurors during the trial, as
to whether they read the articles complained of,
and if so whether they were prejudiced thereby,
court during the jury's absence. These included state-
ments made by an accomplice witness to the effect that
he was in mortal fear of defendant, and that defendant
had pistol-whipped the witness's brother. The Court of
Appeals stated, "These articles.. . contained additional
facts... which the jurors were not entitled to know...
and which were devastating to... [defendant's] cause."
Id. at 508. See United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133
(7th Cir. 1962).
In Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961), the Supreme Court of
Alaska affirmed denial of defendant's motion for mis-
trial, although the material complained of consisted of
testimony which had been excluded by the trial court.
Choosing to apply the Marshall rule, the court distin-
tinguished Marshall on the ground that the excluded
testimony in the instant case was inadmissible because
of irrelevancy, not because of its prejudicial nature. The
court stated: "If the conversation had not been ex-
cluded, it would have amounted to... additional cor-
roborative evidence of the same general type that was
admissible and had been introduced." Id. at 899.
101 Under the Marshall rule, evidence which is inci-
dentally prejudicial to the defendant but held inadmis-
sible because of some evidentiary rule (e.g., hearsay,
irrelevancy, etc.), would probably be treated as if it had
been excluded by reason of its prejudicial nature, inas-
much as the effect of the material, not the stated reason
for its inadmissibility as evidence, determines whether
or not a defendant was in fact prejudiced by its publica-
tion.
i0 Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), affirm-
ing 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1962) (10 months); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952) (6 weeks); United
States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) (2
years); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 501,
159 N.E.2d 870, 881, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959)
(4-5 months). The rationale seems to be: the longer the
lapse of time, the less the likelihood that an atmosphere
of prejudice still prevails. Some defense lawyers share
this opinion that in all but exceptional cases, the passage
of time doeshave this effect. Interview With Mr. Gerald
Getty, Public Defender, Cook County, Ill., April 16,
1962. It may be, however, that the objective yardstick
is of no practical value, for prejudice may not die a
natural death with the passage of time-especially in a
case which has received widespread publicity. See note
78 supra and accompanying text. For an example of a
case in which the persisting atmosphere of prejudice
was overwhelming, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923).
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most reviewing courts will not disturb the result.'01
It has been recognized, however, that such ques-
tioning may be harmful to a defendant's cause.
For example, in Briggs v. United States,'04 defend-
ant moved for a mistrial, but declined to accept
the trial court's offer to interrogate the jury. Re-
versing the conviction rendered after the trial
court refused to declare a mistrial, the Sixth Circuit
stated, "It could very well be that questioning the
jury would be more prejudicial than helpful. We
do not believe that appellant was required to agree
to such questioning in order to preserve his conten-
tion that [he] was entitled to a mistrial." 05 In an-
other case,0 6 defense counsel suggested voir dire
questions designed to elicit the existence of preju-
dice without alerting jurors to prejudicial material.
The trial court's insistence on asking questions in
such a form as to make the jurors aware of the
material constituted one ground for reversal.is?
103 E.g., Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 138
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957) (failure to
interrogate on voir dire re pre-trial publicity); Gicinto
v. United States, 212 F.2d 8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 884 (1954) (failure to move court to interrogate re
publicity printed during trial); Bucher v. Krause, 200
F.2d 576, 583-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997,
rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 842 (1953) (failure to take
advantage of opportunity further to interrogate im-
panelled jurors re publicity during trial); State v.
fickok, 188 Kan. 473 484-85, 363 P.2d 541, 549
(1961) (no attempt to show prejudice either before or
during trial).
This rule is a logical corollary to the rule that actual
prejudice must be shown (see notes 13 & 14 supra and
accompanyifig text), for without the record of the re-
sults of such interrogation, a reviewing court following
this rule can have no basis for a finding of actual preju-
dice. Those courts which adhere to the view that only
speculative prejudice need be shown (see notes 15-18
supra and accompanying text) do not require interroga-
tion as a procedural prerequisite to a finding of preju-
dice on review. Ser., e.g., Briggs v. United States, 221
F.2d 636 /6th Cir. 1955). This rule is just as logical a
corollary to the speculative prejudice rule, for if the cir-
cumstances raise the presumption of prejudice, the re-
viewing court must find prejudice if the presumption is
not rebutted. Moreover, since the speculative prejudice
rule does not rely on jurors' answers to questions re-
garding their bias or prejudice, absence of answers to
such questions does not impair operation of the rule.
I" Supra note 103.
1i5 Id. at 639.
116 Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.
1953).
107 "[Tihe last thing counsel wished to suggest [to
prospective jurors during voir dire] was any con-
nection of appellant with criminal activities. The
Court ... interrogating the jurors for the purpose
of insuring a fair trial for appellant, proceeded to
ask the very questions which appellant's counsel
were most emphatically insisting constituted
prejudice to his right to a fair trial."
Id. at 909. A case which illustrates the possibly dis-
astrous effects of clums-" interrogation is Smith v.
Failure of a defendant to exhaust his peremptory
challenges, to challenge for cause, or to move for
continuance, change of venue, or mistrial, though
not usually precluding the appellate court from
deciding the issue of impartiality," may lead the
court to infer that the articles complained of did
not in fact generate such widespread and lasting
prejudice as the defendant would like the court to
believe.109
Source and Intent of the Information. If the in-
United States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 909 (1956), rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 86 & 87
supra. See Note, 50 J. CRw. L., C. & P.S. 374, 381
(1960).
108 In State v. LaRocca, 81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d
578 (App. Div. 1963), however, the court held that de-
fendant's failure to exercise an available peremptory
challenge to an allegedly prejudiced juror who was not
challengeable for cause precluded his attempt to over-
turn the verdict on appeal, stating, "To do so would
render the voir dire meaningless." Id. at 44, 194 A.2d
at 580.
109 The following language is indicative of the induc-
tive reasoning typically practiced by many courts:
"Every juror who sat in the case was pronounced ac-
ceptable to the defendant by his counsel and this
could hardly have occurred if there had been any
impression in his mind that the jurymen had been
prejudicially affected by the objectionable publica-
t in...."
People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 152, 109 N.E. 127, 135
(1915).
"[D]efendants waived some of their peremptory chal-
lenges ... [so] we must assume that.., they were
able to obtain fair and impartial jurors who were not
biased or pr~judiced by reason of the news media
complained of."
State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 485, 363 P.2d 541, 550
(1961).
"[I]n an effort to determine whether there was public
hysteria or widespread community prejudice against
petitioner at the time of his trial, we think it signifi-
cant that ... [his attorneys] saw no occasion to seek
a transfer of the action to another county on the
ground that prejudicial newspaper accounts had
made it impossible for petitioner to obtain a fair
trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County."
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194 (1952). Accord,
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (failure to
challenge petit jurors for cause implied trial court's
acceptance of their declarations of impartiality was cor-
rect); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963)
(failure to request more than one change of venue and.
to challenge for cause); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.
2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928) (failure to move for change of
venue); People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d 443, 472-73,
31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 677-78 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
925, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) (failure to
move for change of venue); Gonzales v. State, -
Okla. Crim. -, 388 P.2d 312 (1964) (waiver of two
peremptory challenges). Contra, Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952) (failure to
move for change of venue and to exhaust peremptory
challenges did not affect reviewing court's decision to
reverse on grounds of prejudice). See Note, 50 J. CSUm.
L., C. & P.S. 374, 378-81 (1960). But cf. note 78 supra
and accompanying text.
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formation contained in the publicity complained
of was instigated solely by the press, federal and
state reviewing courts have been less likely to re-
verse than if an agent of the prosecuting govern-
ment was responsible for disseminationnO Indeed,
the "state action" concept of due process seems
especially applicable to support federally compelled
reversal of state convictions contaminated by pub-
licity promulgated by an officer of the state."'
However, in Rideau -e. Louisiana,"2 where the
United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's
state murder conviction on prejudicial publicity
grounds, the Court expressly disclaimed reliance on
state action as to promulgation of the prejudicial
broadcasts, stating that, although it appeared that
local officials probably had prompted the filmed
interview, "the question of who originally initiated
the idea ... is... a basically irrelevant detail."1'
The state action held by the Court to have de-
prived defendant of his federal rights was the state
trial court's refusal to grant his motions for change
of venue."4 This notion utilized by the Rideau
I Federal: E.g., Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575
(8th Cir. 1928). Affirming a conviction on the ground
that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion for continuance, the court
of appeals noted that "[Ilt is not claimed that the gov-
ernment in any way aided or encouraged these publica-
tions [purporting to outline the government's case]."
Id. at 577. See also Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107 (1st Cir. 1952) (pre-trial publicity caused by con-
gressional committee hearings-rev'd). State: E.g.,
People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915).
Although the court affirmed defendant's conviction, it
stated:
"The case would be quite different if the record dis-
closed any substantial foundation for the suggestion
that the district attorney or his agents were respon-
sible in any way for any publications by which it was
sought to influence the outcome of the trial."
Id. at 152, 109 N.E. at 135.
m "To have the prosecutor himself feed the press
w.ith evidence that no self-restrained press ought to
p :blish in anticipation of a trial is to make the
SK.ite itself through the prosecutor, who wields its
power, a conscious participant in trial by news-
paper, instead of by those methods [constituting
due process of law] which centuries of experience
have shown to be indispensible to the fair ad-
ministration of justice."
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (dissent-
ing opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88 (1923) (inflammatory articles
designed to arouse public sentiment against Negroes
were promulgated by committee of state governor-
Negro defendants' convictions reversed); United States
ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885 (D. Vt. 1962)
(criminal record released to press by prosecutor-
habeas corpus granted).
11 373 U.S. 723 (1963). See texa actcmpanying note
17 supra.
113 373 U.S. at 726.
1 Ibid.
court-that it is the prejudicial effect of an occur-
rence upon the defendant rather than the identity
or motive of the person who caused the event
which is the sole determinant of whether defend-
ant's trial was fair,115 and that the trial court's
failure to cure the effects of the prejudicial occur-
rence constitutes "state action" for due process
purposesu 6-would seem to eradicate any previ-
ously persisting distinction between prosecution-
generated publicity and publicity emanating from
other sources.
In short, reviewing courts are slow to reverse
convictions attacked on prejudicial publicity
grounds, mainly because it is extremely difficult,
as a practical matter, to prove prejudice. Even in
the case where the rights of a particular defendant
are vindicated by reversal of his conviction, this
method is an incomplete solution. Reversal of a
few convictions influenced by prejudicial publicity
will have little, if any, deterrent effect upon pro-
mulgation of like material in subsequent cases. 17
Further, the right of the prosecuting government
fairly to administer criminal justice and to protect
its citizens is entirely neglected by this "solu-
tion."' Where the publicity which occasions re-
versal and remand emanates without participation
of any government official, the government has
been unjustly "punished"-by the trouble and ex-
pense of a new trial, or, if retrial is impossible as a
practical matter or because the appellate court
"I This concept recently has gained increasing ac-
ceptance among state courts. See, e.g., State v. Lea, 259
N.C. 398, 399, 130 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1963) ("[It is the
probable effect or influence upon the jury... and not
... [the judge's] motive, that determines whether the
right of the defendants to a fair trial has been impaired
.... "); People v. Roof, 216 Cal. App. 2d 222, 227,30
Cal. Rptr. 619, 622 (1963) ("It is the effect of the ...
statement, and not the motive behind it, which is
determinative of the question whether the case of de-
fendant was substantially impaired."); People v.
Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355, 360, 190 N.E.2d 19, 21,
239 N.Y.S.2d 673, 677 (1963) ("The fault of... [one
who unintentionally gave false testimony] may be less
but the effect is the same .... ).
116 Cf. DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1962), where the trial court's failure to cure the
prejudicial effects of comment by co-defendant's counsel
upon defendant's failure to testify was held to amount
to governmental action. See especially language in id.
at 153-55.
1 See Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAuL L.
Rxv. 197, 209-10 (1963).
118 See A. T. Burch, Press Coverage of Trials-Is
Cause of Justice Hindered?, Chicago Daily News, May
30. 1964, p. 17, col. 8: "It is the parties to the trial-
not only the defendants, but the prosecution, the wit-
nesses, and even the public treasury-that suffer in-
convenience and expense if a new trial is ordered by a
reviewing court [because of prejudicial publicity]."
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reversed without remand, by the danger that one
who may be a criminal remains at large-while the
guilty press is allowed to go free. And, as we have
seen, the method which would punish the press by
contempt is rarely resorted to.
Summary
It appears that the above methods, as currently
practiced by American courts, are inadequate solu-
tions to the freedom of the press-fair trial con-
flict,u9 for the following brief reasons: (1) con-
19 44.35% of the persons responding to the writer's
tempt, because of disuse; (2) trial level reliefs
because of disuse and lack of deterrent effect; (3)
cautionary instructions, because of human nature;
and (4) reversal, because of disuse, failure to pro-
tect sovereign rights, and lack of deterrent effect.
poll agreed that the existing law fails to protect a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. See Table I, in Part II
of this article. Moreover, 12.44% of those responding
that the law generally is adequate in this regard
stated that it is not adequate in highly publicized cases.
I/id.
1965]
